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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that theoretical research on opportunistic political cycles is very 
intuitive and well developed, empirical literature has found fairly weak evidence of 
opportunistic political cycles. This paper tests the theory in a decade-old democracy – 
Russia. We find strong evidence of very short opportunistic political cycles and 
provide evidence and explanation why many previous attempts to find evidence 
failed. Using the comprehensive list of Russia's regional elections and regional 
monthly panel data between 1996 and 2001, we find that: (1) opportunistic political 
cycles in regional fiscal policies are sizable and short-lived on average; (2) the 
magnitude of opportunistic cycles decreases with voters' rationality and awareness 
(measured by urbanization, computerization, education, and freedom of media); (3) 
there is a learning curve for voters: cycles become smaller with time; (4) cycles in 
fiscal policies increase political popularity and chances for re-election of incumbent 
governors. Our results confirm that maturity of democracy as well as rationality and 
awareness of electorate are very important factors in determination of the scope for 
opportunistic cycles. 
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“You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the 
people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people 
all of the time.”  
(Attributed to Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865)) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite the fact that theoretical research on opportunistic political cycles is 
very intuitive and well developed, empirical literature produced mixed results in 
attempts to find convincing evidence of opportunistic cycles for almost a quarter of a 
century after pioneering work of Nordhaus (1975).1 This apparent contradiction 
between the theory and evidence created an intellectual puzzle. Why did many tests 
fail? Should the theory or the empirics be held responsible? Motivated by this gap, 
several recent works argued that opportunistic cycles should be most sizable in 
developing countries with immature democratic regimes.2 Although, the evidence has 
been strongly supportive of this view, the tests using data from the developing 
countries have not been very high-powered due to data limitations.3 This paper 
attempts to shed further light on this puzzle by putting the opportunistic cycle theory 
to one more test using regional monthly panel data from a decade-old democracy. 
According to the theory, asymmetric information and irrationality magnify the 
size of opportunistic cycles.4 Thus, to ensure the maximum possible size of the cycles, 
the tests should be done in environment with these properties. This paper uses data 
from Russia’s regional elections of executives. First, Russian democracy is very 
young and many regions are notorious for governor’s control over mass media and 
large fraction of uninformed, naïve and myopic electorate. Second, detailed monthly 
                                                 
1 See Drazen (2000) and Franzese (2002) for detailed surveys of theoretical and empirical literatures. 
2 See, for instance, Gonzalez (2000). 
3 See Gonzalez (2000), Shi and Svensson (2001), Block (2001), Block, et. al. (2001), Krueger and 
Turan (1993). 
4 Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Gonzalez (2000). 
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regional-level data allows more powerful tests of the theory than the ones that have 
been done so far. And third, high regional variation in possible determinants of 
opportunistic cycles, on the one hand, and high uniformity in many (would-be-
important and missing in most papers) controls like electoral institutions, scope for 
policymaking, culture, trust, etc., on the other, help to analyze how cycles vary with 
voters’ rationality, awareness, and learning. Thus, Russia provides an ideal case for an 
empirical test of opportunistic political cycles. Indeed, we find very strong evidence 
of cycles in fiscal policies of Russian governors. 
Two strands of literature, opportunistic political business cycles and partisan 
theory, explain inefficient economic fluctuations around elections. The literature on 
opportunistic cycles argues that electoral pressure forces politicians to manipulate 
public policy in order to increase chances of reelection with the help of pre-electoral 
improvements at expense of deterioration after elections. Low asymmetry of 
information between politicians and the public, rationality of voters, and availability 
of institutional checks and balances reduce opportunistic cycles. The alternative 
approach – partisan theory – argues that policies are predetermined by ideology. 
Economic fluctuations arise as a result of policy changes when different parties 
alternate in office: each party in office focuses on the short run improvements for its 
own constituency. Binding commitments to co-operative common policy rule and 
reputation reduce partisan cycles. 
Kalecki (1943) was the first to develop the idea that politicians might alter 
policies in the face of elections. Subsequently, theory of opportunistic cycles and 
partisan theory developed in parallel. The theoretical literature came in two waves. 
The first “non-rational” wave came in 1970s. Nordhaus (1975) built the first 
opportunistic model based on adaptive expectations of voters. Hibbs (1977) 
developed the first partisan model. Frey (1978) and Frey and Schneider (1978) 
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combined the features of opportunistic theory and partisan theory to develop weak 
partisan theory. The second wave reconciled rational expectations with political 
cycles. Alesina (1987) built the rational partisan theory that attributed cycles to wage 
rigidities and uncertainly of election’s outcome. Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff 
(1990), Persson and Tabellini (1990) modeled rational opportunistic cycles that are 
based on asymmetry of information between the incumbent politician and the voters. 
Adaptive expectations models exploited the Phillips curve framework and, thus, 
predicted cycles in growth, unemployment, and inflation. Opportunistic models based 
on rational expectations predict cyclical pattern in fiscal policies rather than real 
outcomes. Recently, Gonzalez (2000) extended the rational models to accommodate 
importance of the institutional context of policymaking: transparency and maturity of 
democratic traditions. 
 Empirical research so far revealed much stronger evidence of partisan than 
opportunistic cycles; particularly, it is apparent in studies of developed countries. For 
instance, using quarterly post-war US data, Alesina and Sachs (1988) found strong 
support for rational partisan theory and Klein (1996) little support for opportunistic 
cycles. Berger and Woitek (1997) rejected both partisan and opportunistic cycles in 
Germany on monthly data. Reid (1997) relaxed the assumption of exogeneity of 
election time and found weak evidence of opportunistic cycles in Canadian provinces. 
Alesina and Roubini (1992) tested the competing theories in a unified framework, 
using panel of 18 OECD countries with quarterly data, and found strong robust 
support for rational partisan cycles and, in selected countries, some evidence of 
rational opportunistic cycles.  
Non-convincing evidence for opportunistic cycles in developed countries 
motivated the new wave of empirical research using data from developing countries 
with an emphasis on the determinants of cycles: for instance, development of 
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democratic institutions and availability of checks and balances. Schuknecht (1998, 
2000) found evidence of cycles in budget expenditures and investment based on 
quarterly panel data for 25 developing countries and showed that cycles are much 
larger in countries with low inflation costs. Block (2001) used annual data for 69 
developing countries to show that budget cycles took place only in countries with 
sufficient electoral competition. Block, et. al. (2001) confirmed this result on data for 
44 African countries. In addition, they found that cycles got weaker as voters learned. 
Shi and Svensson (2000) analyzed data from 123 countries and also found some 
evidence of cycles, which is significantly stronger for developing countries. Gonzalez 
(2000) found some evidence of fiscal cycles in Mexico and showed that they are 
related to the levels of democracy and transparency. Thus, recent research with the 
focus on fiscal instruments in developing countries produced more convincing 
evidence of opportunistic cycles. This evidence, however, is not always as strong as 
one could expect and as it sounds. Important reasons for this are insufficient 
frequency of data and lack of appropriate controls; we address these problems in this 
paper. 
Keller and May (1984) used the case of President Nixon’s election campaign 
to argue that one needs to look at the political actions rather than the real economic 
outcomes to find evidence of opportunistic cycles. Overall, pure (non-rational) 
theories à la Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) are proven to be inconsistent with 
results of virtually all empirical tests: Drazen (2000) surveys empirical literature to 
show that, when found, cycles affect fiscal and monetary policies rather than 
outcomes.  
Based on the case of the four federal Russian elections, Treisman and 
Gimpelson (2001) argued that traditional empirical approach underestimates 
opportunistic cycles because it considers policy instruments separately, whereas, 
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politicians change them from one election to another depending on political 
environment. Large samples, however, should allow observing opportunistic cycles in 
each policy instrument separately despite this underestimation. 
This paper tests for the presence of opportunistic political cycles in Russian 
regions in a whole range of fiscal policy instruments as well as real economic 
outcomes. Then, it addresses the question of how rationality of voters, their access to 
unbiased information, and maturity of democracy affect the magnitude of the cycles. 
Finally, we study whether opportunistic cycles help governors to get reelected. 
We find opportunistic political cycles in many regional fiscal policies 
controlling for region-specific characteristics, federal trend, seasonality, and 
fluctuations driven by differences in ideology (partisan cycles). Just as predicted by 
the rational theory of opportunistic cycles, total budgetary expenditures, spending on 
education, healthcare, social disbursements, industrial subsidies, and mass media as 
well as repayments of wage arrears to public workers exhibit clear cyclical pattern. 
They start to grow approximately nine months before elections, continue rising 
gradually, and jump high up one month before elections. Right after elections 
spending drops and wage arrears start to accumulate. Above average inflationary 
pressure, leads to price rises right after elections. Industrial growth is not significantly 
affected by elections in contrast to predictions of the first wave of non-rational 
opportunistic models à la Nordhaus (1975). 
Use of monthly panel data allowed us very careful measurement of even very 
short cycles. This turned out to be very important because most sizable positive 
changes happen a month before and negative changes a month after elections, thus, 
lower frequency data would have substantially underestimated cycles. To the best of 
our knowledge all empirical studies on developing countries so far used quarterly or 
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annual data.5 This seems to be the reason for why results have not been very 
satisfactory: very short cycles, like the ones in Russia, cannot be clearly seen in 
quarterly data since elections often occur in the middle of the quarter. 
What determines the magnitude of opportunistic cycles? We find that our 
proxies for rationality and informational symmetry (education level, urbanization, 
computerization, and freedom of media) significantly decrease the amplitude of the 
cycles. In addition, cycles get smaller with time, which may be an indication of 
voters’ learning as Russia’s democracy matures. The results suggest that maturity of 
democracy is a very important factor determining scope for the effective use of 
political cycles: it pays in young democracies and it does not in the environments with 
high voter’s rationality and awareness as well as mature democratic institutions. We 
also find that cycles in fiscal policy instruments significantly increase popularity of 
incumbents and help them win. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the data. Section 3 formulates hypotheses and empirical methodology. Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The data  
 2.1. Sample and data sources 
The comprehensive list of regional governor elections that took place in 
Russia between August 1995 and June 2002 consists of 169 electoral events.6 We 
exclude elections in Chechnya and Ingushetia from our sample because the 
fluctuations in fiscal policies of these regions have been driven by war rather than 
                                                 
5 The only paper that uses monthly data is Berger and Voitek (1997). Even though, the data were suited 
well for the test, they reject hypothesis of opportunistic cycles for the German developed democracy.  
6 This list covers elections in all regions but Dagestan, the only region where the governor is appointed.  
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elections. Data on most policy instruments and outcomes are available for 149 
elections that took place in the period between 1996 and 2001. 
The source of data on elections is Tsentrizbirkom, the Central Elections 
Committee of the Russian Federation. Data on regional fiscal policies and outcomes 
come from two sources: Goskomstat, the State Committee of Statistics, that provided 
monthly data on wages and income, wage arrears including arrears from the regional 
budgets, price level, and industrial output between 1995 and 2001; and the Ministry of 
Finance of the Russian Federation that provided detailed monthly regional budgetary 
data for the period between 1996 and 2001. Data on computerization, urbanization 
and education also come from Goskomstat. The data on freedom of media in the 
regions were provided by the Institute of Free Media (www.freepress.ru). Appendix A 
presents descriptive statistics of the data. 
2.2. The first glance at the data 
Figures 1 and 2 show dynamics of the four month moving average of the 
Russia’s aggregate of seasonally adjusted de-trended regional policy instruments and 
outcomes from a year before to a year after elections. Zero-month is the month of 
elections. The policy instruments and outcomes are in logs and normalized so that 
zeros on the vertical axes represent the average levels of the variables over the 
incumbent’s term in power. Two horizontal lines on each graph represent average 
values of the instruments in a year before and in a year after elections. 
Total budgetary expenditures, budget deficit, expenditures on culture and 
media, and share of social expenditures show gradual increase during the year before 
elections and a sharp drop at the time of elections. Expenditures on healthcare and 
education peak half a year before elections, remain high till elections, and decline 
sharply thereafter. Budgetary revenues are relatively smooth and steady before 
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elections and drop after elections. The average values of all these instruments in the 
year before elections are higher than in the year after elections (this can be seen from 
the comparison of horizontal lines). Cyclical changes in social expenditures, industrial 
and agricultural subsidies are less profound, but in each case elections fall on local 
maxima. Graphs clearly show opportunistic political cycles in total and regional wage 
arrears that decrease throughout the year before elections and rebound right after the 
elections. Industrial output, wage level, and money income peak right before elections 
as well. Prices steadily decline the first nine months in the pre-election year. 
Inflationary pressure drives prices up closer to elections. Series of tax revenues and 
industrial growth do not show a visible cyclical pattern. 
Overall, the first glance at the data tentatively suggests that fiscal policies are 
subject to opportunistic political cycles in the Russian regions. One, however, needs 
to see whether the visual results survive rigorous econometric analysis. 
 
3. Hypotheses and empirical methodology 
3.1. Test of opportunistic cycles 
Theory of opportunistic cycles predicts that governors pursue expansionary 
fiscal and/or monetary policies before elections irrespective of their ideological 
platform. Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) model predicts that politicians manipulate fiscal 
policies in pre-election times with subsequent increase in inflation and no effect on 
real economic outcomes. Nordhaus’s (1975) model predicts that cycles affect real 
economic activity: unemployment and GDP growth. We test whether these 
predictions are consistent with the data treating election dates as exogenous. Reid 
(1997) and Heckelman and Berument (1998) pointed out that opportunistic cycles can 
also occur as a result of setting election date at a time of a boom. We abstract from 
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this possibility because less than 15% of Russia’s regional elections happened more 
than a month of their expected date (the number insufficient for quantitative analysis); 
moreover, several times elections were shifted exogenously, because governors were 
promoted to the federal government before their terms ended.7  
 To test the existence of cycles and analyze their duration, we utilize the event 
study methodology. The following specification of panel regressions with regional 
fixed-effects was used: 
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where i – region; t – ordinal number of a month; y stands for a de-trended monthly 
instrument or outcome of regional policy.8 mjit is a dummy that equals to 1, if t is j 
months away from elections in region i (negative j means that t is prior to elections, 
positive – that t is after elections, j=0 in the month of elections); fi – regional fixed 
effects.9 Term equals to 0, 1, 2, or 3 depending on which term is the governor serves 
in office; 0 indicates that the governor is appointed and has not been elected before; 1 
indicates that the governor was elected for the first time, etc. 
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average of the values of the policy instrument in the previous four months; this 
variable accounts for autocorrelation processes in equation (1).10 Electoral campaign 
platforms of Russia’s governors are polarized into the “communist left” and the 
“liberal-democratic ideology”.11 Left is a dummy that equals 1 if the incumbent 
                                                 
7 It is illegal to shift the date of regional elections. 
8 The detailed description of how the policy instruments were de-trended is presented below in this 
section. 
9 The regression has a constant term because fi’s joint mean is normalized to zero. 
10 We use smoothed lagged value of the policy instruments because of better fit due to large month-to-
month volatility in the data. 
11 Partisan theory implicates a priori differences in ideology: “communist left” ideology opts for a 
larger size of government and larger redistribution. This implies that, ceteris paribus, social 
expenditures, government deficit, and inflation should be greater if communist governors are in power. 
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governor is supported by the Communist Left wing coalition12. This dummy controls 
for the partisan cycles. The variation in the data is insufficient, however, to have a 
proper test of this theory because there are only seven cases when new governor of 
the opposite ideological platform replaced an incumbent governor after elections; and, 
therefore, ideology of governors is almost perfectly collinear with regional fixed 
effects. Thus, we do not put emphasis on the interpretation of the sign of coefficient 
of the “left-wing” dummy. 
We consider three groups of policy instruments and outcomes: budgetary 
expenditures (total budgetary expenditures, expenditures on social programs, 
education, culture, healthcare, mass media, and subsidies to industry and agriculture), 
budgetary revenues and deficit (total budgetary revenues, tax revenues, and deficit) 
and economic performance indicators (growth, inflation, the level of industrial output, 
total wage arrears and regional wage arrears, wage level, price level and money 
income). 
An important methodological question is how to control for the 
macroeconomic shocks and the federal policy that affects the regions. In particular, 
this is essential, because in 1996 at one instance, several regional elections and the 
federal elections took place in Russia. In order to eliminate the effects of the federal 
policy (which can also be cyclical in the face of the federal elections) we tried each of 
the three following options that produced the same results.13 First, we defined each of 
the policy instruments as a ratio of the actual value of the instrument to the federal 
level of this variable (which is calculated as population-weighted average of the 
regional values). Second, we added the federal trend as regressor in the panel 
                                                 
12 The name of the coalition is Peoples Patriots Union of Russia (“Narodno-Patriotichesky Souz 
Rossii”); most governors in this coalition are the members of the Communistic Party of the Russian 
Federation. 
13 The same approaches were used by Alesina and Roubini (1992). 
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regression. Third, we added month dummies as regressors. The results of these three 
approaches are very similar, thus, throughout the paper we use the specifications of 
the first approach: all considered policy instruments and outcomes are already de-
trended. 
Another methodological question is how to control for seasonal fluctuations. It 
is important because a large portion of regional elections had taken place in the same 
months (elections frequently happen in the end of the year, particularly often in 
December). We tried the following alternative strategies. First, to control for the 
common to all regions seasonal fluctuations, it is sufficient to include eleven month 
dummies in the regression or de-trend just as described in the previous paragraph. 
Thus, controls for the federal trend take care of common to all regions seasonality. 
Second, to control for region-specific seasonality, we included fixed effects for each 
of the region-month combinations (86 regions times 11 months) in equation (1). Each 
strategy produced very similar results in magnitude with a slight loss of significance 
in the latter case due to a significant loss of degrees of freedom. Thus, we report 
regression results for the control for common to all regions seasonality, since most 
seasonal fluctuations are common to all regions and, therefore, they are subtracted 
from the policy instruments together with the federal trend. 
 Significant coefficients at dummies indicating the time distance from elections 
(αj) point toward the shifts in the autocorrelation process of the policy instrument. 
Thus, positive significant values of the estimates of αj before elections and negative 
significant values of the estimates of αj after elections would serve as evidence of the 
opportunistic political cycles.  
Lags in panel regressions may bias the estimators (Hansen, 1982 and White, 
1982). The bias converges to zero when time dimension of a panel goes to infinity. 
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Our monthly panel covers almost seventy months (six years). Therefore, the 
asymptotic properties can be applied. Nonetheless, we estimated equation (1) using 
the Arellano-Bond procedure (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Our results were not 
changed by this technique. 
3.2. Determinants of opportunistic cycles 
The second step of our analysis is the study of the determinants of the 
magnitude of opportunistic cycles. We test the predictions of the theory that the size 
of opportunistic cycles is negatively related to rationality of voters, access to unbiased 
sources of information, and the maturity of democracy (see, for instance, Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) and Gonzalez (2000)).  
As a measure of the amplitude of the cycle in a particular policy instrument for 
a particular election, we take the pre-electoral month deviation of the value of the 
policy instrument from the regional trend net of seasonal fluctuations. Thus, we define 
the amplitudes as pre-electoral month residuals from estimation of the following 
equation separately for each region in the sample: 
{ }
itt
j
jtjit Timedmy εβα ++= ∑
∈ 12;1
)ln(        (2) 
As yit, we used only fiscal policy instruments, since they turned out to have the 
significant opportunistic cycles after estimation of equation (1). dmjt in equation (2) 
stands for month dummies corresponding to 12 calendar months. Timet is the real time 
measured in months. In addition to considering the amplitudes in each budgetary item 
separately, we took an aggregate measure the magnitude constructed as the first 
principal component of the amplitudes in individual fiscal policies with the most 
profound electoral cycle, viz., total budgetary expenditures, social expenditures, 
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expenditures on culture, education, mass media, and regional industrial subsidies.14 
Summary statistics for each individual proxy of the amplitude are presented in table 1. 
For all policy instruments, the mean amplitudes are positive and, for ten out of 
thirteen policy instruments, they are significant. 
To examine which factors influence the magnitude of the cycles, we run the 
following equation on the pooled cross section of elections: 
iiiii LeftTimeRA εββββ ++++= 3210       (3) 
where i is the ordinal number of elections. Ai is the amplitude of the cycle (as 
described above). Ri is a proxy for rationality of voters and their awareness. We use 
the following measures of Ri: the share of population with higher education, the 
number of computers per capita, the share of urban population, and the index of 
freedom of media production. Negative significant coefficient at Ri is interpreted as 
evidence that irrationality or unawareness is associated with higher amplitude of the 
cycle. Real time (Timei) was included in the regression to find out how cycles change 
with time, in other words, whether learning by voters and maturity of democracy 
decrease incentives to use cycles. Learning is not the only possible interpretation of 
the negative coefficient at Timei: an alternative story is the disciplining role of Putin’s 
more centralized administration compared to Yeltsin’s time. There has not been any 
formal institutional change in the regional elections mechanism and authority of 
regional governments over spending in their budgets from Yeltsin’s to Putin’s time, 
however. As before, Lefti controls for the ideological platform of incumbents. In 
estimation of equation (3), from the sample we excluded elections that took place in 9 
Autonomous Okrugs, the regions that are subdivisions of other larger regions.  
                                                 
14 The first principal component explains 43% of the total variation in these measures. The factor 
loadings are as follows: 0.70 (Total Budget Expenditures) + 0.57 (Social Expenditures) + 0.73 
(Expenditures on Culture) + 0.77 (Education Expenditures) + 0.29 (Media Expenditures) + 0.04 
(Expenditures on Industry). 
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3.3. Do cycles help wining? 
Finally, we investigate whether it pays to pursue cyclical opportunistic 
policies. Russia’s incumbent governors have been active in trying to retain power 
(95% of them ran for re-election) and they have been more successful than the 
opposition in attaining votes (66.5% of those who ran for another term won).15 This is 
an impressive score considering deep recession that Russia experienced for most of 
the transition period. To test whether cycles helped incumbent governors to get re-
elected, we estimate how the probability to win and the share of incumbents’ votes 
depend on the amplitude of the cycles and the time trend, controlling for the ideology 
of incumbent governor and governor’s performance in the last term. We also test if 
the effect of cycles on the probability to win depends on proxies for rationality and 
learning. We estimate the following equations on the pooled cross section of 
elections: 
iiiiiiiiiii RPerformTimeLeftTimeTimeRRAARRAP εγγγγγγγγ +++++−−+−−++= 76543210 ))(())(()ln(  (4) 
Prob{incumbent - below the 2nd place; incumbent - the 1st runner up; incumbent wins}i= 
iiiiiiiiii RPerformTimeLeftTimeTimeRRAARRA εφφφφφφφφγ +++++−−+−−++= 76543210 ))(())((     (5) 
where Pi is the popularity of incumbent measured by the ratio of votes pro- to votes 
against incumbent on elections i. Ai is the proxy for the aggregate amplitude of the 
cycles prior to elections i, equal to the first principal component of the main cyclical 
fiscal policies as in equation (3). Ri are our proxies for rationality and awareness. The 
cross-terms ))(( AARR ii −−  and ))(( TimeTimeRR ii −−  are included to test whether 
                                                 
15 This proportion is significantly larger than a half at 1% significance level. Table 1 presents summary 
statistics of Russia’s regional elections. 
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rationality, awareness, and learning reduce the effectiveness of cyclical policies.16 
Positive significant coefficient at Ai is an indication that cycles help to get reelected. 
Negative coefficients at cross-terms mean that rationality, awareness and time reduce 
the influence of the amplitude on chances of reelection. Control variables are as 
follows: Lefti is as described above. Performi is a column vector of proxies for 
governor’s performance in the last term comprised of the differences between the 
overall regional means and the regional means over the last term for the following 
variables: log share of social expenditures, log labor productivity and log price level.17 
Equation (5) is the multivariate ordered probit model with the same set of 
regressors as in (4) and with there outcomes for the incumbent: wins, is the first 
runner up, is below the second place. We also estimate simple probit model with two 
outcomes: wins/loses. Both approaches produce almost identical results. In estimation 
of equations (4) and (5), from the sample we exclude elections with the single 
candidate, elections, in which incumbent did not run for reelection and did not name 
his successor, and elections in Autonomous Okrugs. In addition, we used Cook’s 
distance approach (Cook, 1977) to exclude four outliers that had excessively strong 
effect on our estimates. 
There is an endogeneity problem in estimation of equations (4) and (5), 
however. If governors are sure of wining because their rating is too high, they would 
have weak incentives to use cyclical policy since it is costly in the long run. In this 
case, the tighter the electoral competition, the higher the incentives for pre-electoral 
manipulations. Thus, this link from popularity and probability to win to the incentives 
for cyclical behavior implies negative correlation between popularity and cycles. 
                                                 
16 Upper bars denote the mean values. Subtraction of means before taking the cross-term does not 
change the interpretation of the coefficient at the cross-term, but makes the interpretation of the 
coefficients of Ai easier: it becomes equal to the full effect of the amplitude, evaluated at R and Time .  
17 γ6 and φ6 are row vectors.  
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Thus, if there are governors that are sure of re-election, we are likely to underestimate 
a positive causal relationship between the magnitude of the cycles and the probability 
to win with regressions (4) and (5).18 One could argue that too low probability to win 
may also reduce incentives for cyclical policy because budgetary resources instead of 
being spent in favor of voters could be diverted by incumbents who are sure of losing. 
This would have implied that we overestimate the causal effect of the magnitude of 
the cycles on popularity. There have not, however, been regional elections so far in 
Russia where incumbent governors did not have a good chance of wining. Therefore, 
overall we are likely to underestimate the effect.19  
 
4. Results 
The results of estimation of equation (1) are presented in tables 2 and 3. Table 
2 presents regression results for fiscal policy instruments. Total budgetary 
expenditures experience the first significant jump up of 5.5% nine months before 
elections; then, up until month 3 prior to elections, there are no significant rises in 
expenditures (coefficients are mostly positive, but insignificant); at month 3 prior to 
elections, the second significant jump up in total expenditures of 6% occurs, the next 
and the biggest rise in expenditures of 11% happens one month before elections. The 
election month and the month right after the elections are characterized by the 
significant falls in total budget expenditures of 6% and 5%, respectively. We do not 
find significant changes in total expenditures after the month 2. Budgetary 
expenditures on education, culture, and healthcare follow the same but slightly more 
profound pattern. Education expenditures rise significantly by 6% twelve months 
                                                 
18 Cook’s distance approach eliminated observations in which incumbents have the highest political 
rating. Therefore, it partly eliminated this problem. 
19 Instrumenting the amplitude is the way to solve this problem, but we do not have a good instrument. 
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prior to elections. All three expenditure items jump up by 14, 12, and 23%, 
respectively, in the three consecutive months, eight months before elections. Six 
months before elections, education and healthcare expenditures rise by 5% each. 
Cultural expenditures fall by 5% four months before elections. Healthcare spending 
jumps up by 6.5% two months before elections. Education, culture and healthcare 
expenditures jump up again by 13, 11, and 17%, respectively, one month before 
elections. These expenditure items fall by 7, 19, and 10% respectively during the three 
months right after the elections.20 
Cycles in social spending item are more gradual: it rises significantly for two 
months, 9 months before elections (by total of 23%) and, then, jumps up each month 
prior to elections starting four months before elections. During the month right before 
elections social expenditures rise by 32%. Accumulated growth in social expenditures 
over the year before elections amounts to 135%, which is much higher than in any 
other expenditure item. Unlike other fiscal instruments, social expenditures do not 
drop sharply after elections. Dummies at the first and the second month after elections 
have small insignificant negative coefficients. Expenditures on industry (e.g., 
industrial subsidies) rise significantly by 29% a month before elections and fall 
insignificantly for two months after elections. Cycles in agricultural subsidies are 
insignificant. The pattern is the same, however: two months before elections, 
coefficients of the months dummies are positive and two months after – negative.  
Cyclical dynamics in these expenditure items is supported by the intensive use 
of mass media: expenditures on mass media exhibit 34% growth in two pre-electoral 
months and 22% fall in two post-electoral months. Changes in social and media 
expenditures are disproportionately large compared to other expenditure items. Share 
of social expenditures in total expenditures rises significantly by 9, 15, 19, and 15% in 
                                                 
20 Changes in healthcare expenditures are consistently negative but insignificant in this period. 
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months -4, -2, -1, and 0, respectively. Share of media expenditures jumps up by 18% 
two months before elections. 
Budgetary revenues grow by 5% one month before elections and decrease by 
14% during two months right after elections. Taxes significantly jump up only three 
months before elections by 5% and fall right after elections by 6%. Budget deficit, 
e.g. ratio of expenditures to revenues, exhibits significant increases six, four, and one 
month before elections (by 8, 4, and 6%, respectively). Thus, incumbent governors 
pursue expansionary policy while trying not to overburden enterprises with taxation. 
Table 3 presents the effect of elections on dynamics of real economic 
outcomes and wage arrears. Regional growth does not exhibit a significant cyclical 
pattern. The level of industrial output falls down significantly both before and after 
elections. This finding can be explained by tougher tax collection before elections 
(e.g., tax increase 3 months prior to elections) and lower industrial subsidies after 
elections. Tax reduction after elections can be attributed to post-electoral recession 
since magnitudes of their changes are similar. 
Inflation does not shift significantly around elections, but the price level does. 
After elections price level increases significantly in months 2, 3, 4, 11, and 12. (Each 
of these increases, however, is very small – below half a percent). Although price 
increases after elections are econometrically significant, they are much smaller in 
magnitude than fluctuations in fiscal policy instruments. Thus, our fiscal policy cycles 
results hold irrespective of whether we take real or nominal values of the policy 
instruments.21 Money income falls slightly in the middle of the year before elections, 
but grows in three pre-electoral months by 3, 8 and 11%. Wage level grows 2% in the 
pre-electoral month and falls by approximately 3% in months 3 and 4 after elections. 
                                                 
21 We tested for presence of cycles in nominal policy instruments directly (disregarding the price 
differences between regions). The results were the same. 
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Arrears in wages to public workers are repaid before elections. Wage arrears 
decline each month during the whole year prior to elections with the rate of 
approximately 4% per month and stabilize after elections. Wage arrears from the 
regional budgets start to decline nine months before elections, continue decreasing 
with a growing pace up until elections and also stabilize after elections. The total drop 
in regional wage arrears over the nine months before elections amounts to 77% of the 
initial level. 
Overall, we find very strong evidence of opportunistic cycles in fiscal policies 
and no evidence of pre-electoral expansion in economic growth. Our results are fully 
consistent with opportunistic cycles à la Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and inconsistent 
with opportunistic cycle theory à la Nordhaus (1975): There is no output expansion 
before elections. Such policies as wage arrears repayments, social expenditures, and 
spending on mass media are the main instruments of fiscal pre-electoral 
manipulations. Cycles are very short: the largest shifts in policy instruments occur 
within a month or two from the election date. 
Let us turn to the discussion of determinants of the size of cycles. Table 4 
presents the results of estimation of equation (3). We report all regression result for 
the aggregate measure of the amplitude of the cycles and only those regressions that 
have significant results for rationality and awareness proxies in the regressions of the 
amplitudes in individual policy instruments. The data confirm the theoretical 
prediction that rationality and awareness smoothens cycles. Different measures of 
rationality and awareness are significant for different measures of the amplitude, but 
there are many significant results, all of which are of the right sign. 
Urbanization and higher education significantly negatively affect the 
aggregate measure of cycles’ magnitude. The other two proxies for rationality and 
awareness, computerization and the freedom of media, have negative insignificant 
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coefficients. Presence of educated population significantly reduces cycles in education 
and healthcare expenditures: A 10% increase in the share of population with higher 
education decreases the magnitude of the cycles approximately by 2%. Urbanization 
has negative significant effect on the cycles in total, social, and cultural expenditures: 
A 10% increase in the share of urban population decreases cycles in total spending 
and spending on culture by 2% and social spending by 5%. Computerization 
significantly affects cycles in total budget expenditures: A 10% increase in the 
number of computers per capita decreases cycles by 0.7%. Freedom of mass media 
reduces cycles in social and cultural expenditures: A one standard deviation increase 
in the index of freedom of media leads to a 10.6% decrease in cycles in social 
expenditures and a 4% decrease in expenditures on culture. 
Time, our proxy for learning and maturity of democracy, also negatively 
significantly affects the size of the cycle. Cycles fade away relatively fast: Each 
additional year decreases the magnitude of cycles by about 3.5%. Thus, maturity of 
democracy is an important factor reducing opportunistic cycles. We also estimated the 
effect of an additional round of regional elections in an average region just as was 
done by Block, et. al. (2001): An additional election in a region reduces the 
magnitude of the cycles by approximately 34%. Thus, the second wave of regional 
elections had substantially smaller cycles. Time in our opinion is a more appropriate 
measure of learning and maturity of democracy because voters can learn from other 
electoral events like federal elections, elections in regional legislature, etc.   
Table 5 presents the results of the test whether cycles help to get reelected 
(estimation of equations (4) and (5)). We find strong evidence of political benefits of 
cyclical policies: ceteris paribus, an increase in magnitude of the fiscal policy cycle 
significantly affects the political rating of the incumbent governor and the probability 
of re-election. A 10% increase in the magnitude of the cycle leads to a 4% growth in 
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incumbents’ popularity. We should emphasize that we most probably underestimate 
the effect of the cycles on chances to get re-elected because of possible endogeneity 
(discussed in the methodology section) and because we assumed the same mix of 
fiscal policy instruments for the measure of magnitude across regions. Cross-terms are 
insignificant in all regressions, except that the cross-term of the amplitude and 
computerization has negative significant coefficient in regression of incumbent’s 
popularity: the effect of cycles on incumbent’s popularity decreases with 
computerization. Thus, there is no robust relationship between the effect of cycles on 
popularity, on the one hand, and learning and rationality, on the other.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we tested for existence of opportunistic political cycles and 
studied whether rationality, awareness and maturity of democracy has effect on 
cycles. We also examined if cycles increase governors’ chances to get reelected and if 
this effect depends on rationality and learning. The monthly regional panel data 
allowed us to define timing of the cycles more precisely than it has been done in the 
literature and avoid problems with usually missing institutional controls. 
We found very strong evidence that: 
1) Opportunistic political cycles in budgetary spending have taken place in Russian 
regions in the period between 1996 and 2001. Most sizable cyclical changes happen 
within a month away from elections. Short length of the cycles explains why many 
previous tests of the theory did not find convincing evidence of cycles. 
2) The magnitude of the cycles decreases with education, urbanization, 
computerization, and the freedom of media as well as with time. Thus, informational 
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symmetry, rationality and maturity of democracy are very important factors 
influencing cycles. 
3) The scale of pre-electoral improvements increases popularity of incumbent 
governors and the probability to get re-elected. This effect is not robustly related to 
maturity of democracy or proxies for rationality and awareness: Of all our proxies, 
only computerization decreases the effect of cycles on chances to get reelected. 
 The main contribution of our paper to the existing literature on opportunistic 
cycles is in showing why previous studies underestimated the cycles. First, quarterly 
frequency of data is insufficient: cycles are short-lived. And second, in maturing 
democracy cycles disappear very fast. Ten years of Russia’s democratic tradition very 
significantly reduced cycles. Each round of regional elections reduces cycles by over 
30%. 
Russian democracy is very young. Thus, the presence of cycles itself may not 
be such a bad piece of news because it confirms that there is some electoral pressure 
on Russia’s governors. Thus, so-called “administrative resource”, e.g., the ability to 
influence the vote count, does not completely annihilate political incentives. Evidence 
suggests that voters learn quite fast, and therefore, Russian governors are bound to 
respond to the political pressures in increasingly more efficient way. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the constructed measures of the amplitude of the cycles 
 Obs. Mean Median S.E. Min Max 
Amplitude of the Cycle in:       
Total Budget Expenditures 123 0.086* 0.079 0.017 -0.449 0.591 
Social Expenditures 125 0.180* 0.144 0.036 -1.164 1.759 
Education Expenditures 125 0.087* 0.081 0.016 -0.384 0.494 
Expenditures on Culture 125 0.077* 0.117 0.023 -0.723 0.693 
Healthcare Expenditures 125 0.080* 0.072 0.021 -0.691 0.823 
Media Expenditures 124 0.140* 0.123 0.043 -1.250 1.454 
Expenditures on Industry 120 0.237* 0.273 0.064 -1.542 2.154 
Ratio of Expenditures to Revenues 123 0.046* 0.054 0.014 -0.456 0.485 
Negative of Total Wage Arrears 72 0.059* 0.038 0.015 -0.288 0.389 
Negative of Regional Wage Arrears 59 0.148* 0.091 0.041 -0.401 1.115 
Expenditures on Agriculture 121 0.058 -0.019 0.051 -1.516 1.613 
Total Budget Revenues 125 0.036 0.023 0.019 -0.703 0.575 
Negative of Tax Revenues 125 0.006 0.004 0.018 -0.666 1.090 
Note: Stars denote mean amplitudes that are significantly different from zero. 
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 Table 2. Cycles in regional budgetary expenditures and revenues.  
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Lag 0.458*** 0.537*** 0.223*** 0.337*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.501*** 0.353*** 0.483*** 0.284*** 0.478*** 0.562*** -0.045* 
 [23.04] [31.24] [10.27] [17.16] [12.98] [12.12] [27.76] [16.97] [26.25] [12.77] [24.96] [32.02] [1.81] 
Term in power -0.003 -0.001 0.01 0.02 0.023** -0.129*** -0.139*** -0.011 0.018 -0.110*** -0.008 0.002 0.028*** 
 [0.30] [0.03] [1.02] [1.62] [2.15] [5.76] [3.52] [0.41] [1.20] [5.38] [0.76] [0.26] [3.94] 
Left wing party -0.004 -0.112** 0.009 0.015 -0.054 0.006 -0.156 -0.075 -0.116** 0.011 0.006 0.015 -0.070*** 
 [0.11] [2.00] [0.27] [0.33] [1.42] [0.07] [1.10] [0.76] [2.14] [0.15] [0.16] [0.46] [2.61] 
month –12 -0.005 0.037 0.059** 0.055 0.047 0.057 -0.011 0.053 0.041 0.06 0.065** 0.031 -0.078*** 
 [0.17] [0.83] [2.13] [1.61] [1.60] [0.95] [0.10] [0.68] [0.99] [1.09] [2.30] [1.23] [3.74] 
month –11 -0.012 0.059 -0.004 -0.003 0.015 0.087 -0.044 -0.1 0.072* 0.09 0.017 -0.031 -0.024 
 [0.41] [1.31] [0.16] [0.07] [0.52] [1.45] [0.40] [1.27] [1.76] [1.61] [0.60] [1.23] [1.17] 
month –10 0.015 0.094** 0.067*** 0.039 0.070*** 0.117** -0.014 -0.04 0.043 0.098* 0.022 -0.018 -0.008 
 [0.53] [2.34] [2.69] [1.25] [2.61] [1.98] [0.14] [0.56] [1.07] [1.83] [0.87] [0.80] [0.40] 
month -9 0.055** 0.110*** 0.059** 0.117*** 0.090*** 0.073 0.146 0.001 -0.015 -0.031 0.029 -0.019 0.012 
 [2.00] [2.72] [2.37] [3.75] [3.34] [1.23] [1.44] [0.02] [0.38] [0.57] [1.14] [0.83] [0.58] 
month -8 -0.001 0.036 0.024 0.015 0.048* 0.034 -0.002 -0.101 0.015 0.053 -0.002 0.004 -0.006 
 [0.05] [0.85] [0.91] [0.47] [1.73] [0.59] [0.02] [1.34] [0.38] [1.00] [0.06] [0.16] [0.29] 
month -7 0.023 0.013 0.025 -0.015 0.036 0.019 0.003 -0.065 -0.052 -0.007 0.003 -0.014 0.007 
 [0.92] [0.33] [1.03] [0.51] [1.37] [0.34] [0.03] [0.93] [1.41] [0.13] [0.12] [0.63] [0.40] 
month -6 0.029 -0.036 0.046* 0.023 0.047* -0.102* 0.003 -0.015 -0.046 -0.082* -0.029 -0.025 0.040** 
 [1.17] [0.90] [1.87] [0.73] [1.79] [1.92] [0.03] [0.22] [1.27] [1.68] [1.14] [1.12] [2.20] 
month -5 0.014 0.063 0.023 -0.045 0.016 -0.021 -0.076 0.023 0.036 -0.049 0.036 0.02 0.008 
 [0.56] [1.62] [0.95] [1.48] [0.61] [0.41] [0.77] [0.33] [1.04] [1.04] [1.48] [0.92] [0.43] 
month -4 0.003 0.063* -0.018 -0.051* -0.015 0.006 -0.071 0.008 0.088** -0.008 -0.032 -0.007 0.030* 
 [0.14] [1.65] [0.76] [1.72] [0.60] [0.11] [0.75] [0.12] [2.53] [0.18] [1.35] [0.34] [1.74] 
month -3 0.059** 0.071* -0.008 -0.005 0.012 0.012 -0.074 -0.002 0.04 -0.034 0.028 0.054** 0.023 
 [2.46] [1.84] [0.34] [0.18] [0.48] [0.23] [0.77] [0.03] [1.15] [0.72] [1.17] [2.52] [1.31] 
month -2 0.021 0.142*** 0.018 0.003 0.065** 0.203*** 0.037 -0.012 0.144*** 0.168*** 0.022 0.021 0.023 
 [0.86] [3.62] [0.76] [0.11] [2.50] [3.90] [0.38] [0.17] [4.08] [3.52] [0.87] [0.96] [1.29] 
month -1 0.103*** 0.278*** 0.121*** 0.101*** 0.115*** 0.095* 0.258*** 0.088 0.179*** 0.003 0.046* 0.002 0.060*** 
 [4.20] [7.06] [4.99] [3.34] [4.40] [1.82] [2.63] [1.24] [5.03] [0.06] [1.87] [0.08] [3.44] 
month 0 - elections -0.059** 0.062 -0.047* -0.055* -0.036 -0.114** 0.107 0.058 0.143*** -0.073 -0.080*** -0.005 0.027 
 [2.40] [1.56] [1.93] [1.81] [1.36] [2.16] [1.10] [0.82] [4.06] [1.51] [3.24] [0.25] [1.56] 
month 1 -0.054** -0.041 -0.022 -0.117*** -0.038 -0.084 -0.072 -0.075 0.021 -0.053 -0.072*** -0.067*** 0.003 
 [2.23] [1.03] [0.89] [3.92] [1.48] [1.63] [0.74] [1.09] [0.58] [1.11] [2.93] [3.08] [0.14] 
month 2 -0.025 -0.018 -0.005 -0.045 -0.038 0.009 -0.033 -0.105 0.022 0.016 -0.015 -0.02 -0.015 
 [1.04] [0.49] [0.23] [1.56] [1.55] [0.18] [0.35] [1.61] [0.62] [0.34] [0.66] [0.96] [0.87] 
month 3 0.034 0.057 -0.005 -0.041 0.005 -0.019 0.131 -0.047 0.018 -0.069 0.029 -0.003 -0.011 
 [1.44] [1.51] [0.24] [1.43] [0.19] [0.36] [1.42] [0.72] [0.52] [1.45] [1.25] [0.16] [0.65] 
month 4 -0.013 0.034 0.008 -0.011 0.015 -0.024 0.073 -0.007 0.01 -0.014 -0.03 -0.013 0.031* 
 [0.54] [0.88] [0.32] [0.38] [0.58] [0.46] [0.75] [0.10] [0.28] [0.30] [1.20] [0.62] [1.75] 
month 5 0.032 0.091** 0.046** -0.016 0.038 0.036 0.001 0.005 0.051 -0.007 -0.018 0.002 0.019 
 [1.37] [2.42] [1.99] [0.54] [1.54] [0.71] [0.01] [0.07] [1.50] [0.14] [0.76] [0.11] [1.11] 
month 6 0.006 0.055 0.021 -0.065** -0.008 -0.036 0.058 0.076 0.043 -0.048 -0.016 0 -0.015 
 [0.26] [1.45] [0.89] [2.26] [0.31] [0.73] [0.63] [1.14] [1.27] [1.05] [0.69] [0.00] [0.89] 
month 7 0.019 0.008 -0.003 -0.034 0.017 0.013 -0.097 -0.056 -0.005 -0.026 0.013 0.035* 0.001 
 [0.81] [0.21] [0.12] [1.18] [0.70] [0.27] [1.02] [0.85] [0.16] [0.58] [0.55] [1.67] [0.04] 
month 8 0.005 0.037 0.009 -0.045 0.008 -0.036 0.023 0.003 0.037 -0.053 -0.017 -0.008 0.003 
 [0.24] [0.98] [0.37] [1.56] [0.31] [0.72] [0.25] [0.05] [1.09] [1.16] [0.72] [0.38] [0.19] 
month 9 -0.025 0.006 -0.017 -0.066** -0.018 0.074 0.054 0.061 0.028 0.097** -0.002 0.009 -0.019 
 [1.04] [0.16] [0.72] [2.24] [0.72] [1.46] [0.57] [0.89] [0.82] [2.08] [0.07] [0.44] [1.11] 
month 10 0.016 0.079** 0.004 0.023 -0.006 0.105** 0.048 0.031 0.064* 0.062 -0.042* -0.012 0.030* 
 [0.67] [2.08] [0.19] [0.79] [0.24] [2.10] [0.51] [0.46] [1.90] [1.35] [1.77] [0.59] [1.69] 
month 11 0.03 0.043 0.01 0.068** 0.01 -0.059 -0.016 0.024 0.011 -0.048 0.032 0.021 -0.005 
 [1.30] [1.13] [0.43] [2.34] [0.38] [1.16] [0.17] [0.35] [0.33] [1.03] [1.35] [0.98] [0.31] 
month 12 0.034 0.051 0.038 0.035 0.039 -0.019 -0.024 0.046 0.007 -0.07 0.019 0.047** 0.01 
 [1.32] [1.24] [1.50] [1.09] [1.42] [0.35] [0.22] [0.62] [0.20] [1.38] [0.71] [2.04] [0.60] 
Constant -0.021 -0.038 0.021 -0.038* -0.029 -0.156*** -0.128* -0.199*** -0.036 -0.129*** -0.021 -0.116*** 0.013 
 [1.04] [1.28] [1.13] [1.65] [1.45] [3.64] [1.68] [3.70] [1.26] [3.26] [1.12] [6.74] [0.91] 
Observations 5579 5729 5739 5722 5732 5548 5326 5632 5471 5445 5733 5746 5808 
# of regions 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
R2 0.77 0.49 0.73 0.7 0.6 0.54 0.51 0.42 0.27 0.35 0.72 0.59 0.01 
Note: All dependent variables are de-trended and in logs. They are measured in real terms per capita. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Regional Fixed effects included. 
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 Table 3. Cycles in regional economic outcomes and wage arrears.  
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-0.489*** 0.640*** -0.210*** 0.922*** 0.721*** 0.918*** 0.809*** 0.660*** Lag 
[17.03] [47.07] [7.49] [162.51] [60.07] [115.96] [42.44] [39.41] 
0.001 -0.005 0 -0.003*** 0.001 0.016** -0.03 -0.021*** Term in power 
[0.22] [0.72] [0.55] [4.40] [0.35] [2.19] [0.75] [4.16] 
-0.01 -0.009 -0.001 0.002 -0.008 0.119  -0.029** Left wing party 
[0.58] [0.46] [0.57] [0.68] [1.21] [1.38]  [2.49] 
-0.006 -0.01 0.004*** 0.006*** 0 -0.015 -0.017 0.034*** month –12 
[0.40] [0.54] [2.78] [2.70] [0.03] [1.08] [0.29] [2.69] 
-0.01 -0.029 0.001 0.005** -0.001 -0.027** -0.061 -0.002 month –11 
[0.62] [1.51] [0.75] [2.35] [0.15] [1.99] [1.01] [0.16] 
-0.012 -0.025 0 0.002 -0.006 -0.024* -0.053 0.005 month –10 
[0.79] [1.35] [0.24] [1.13] [1.06] [1.77] [0.89] [0.39] 
-0.017 -0.025 0 0.001 -0.001 -0.040*** -0.101* -0.008 month –9 
[1.13] [1.34] [0.08] [0.36] [0.14] [3.00] [1.71] [0.70] 
-0.029* -0.055*** 0 0 -0.003 -0.039*** -0.088 -0.029** month –8 
[1.85] [3.00] [0.21] [0.17] [0.58] [2.88] [1.55] [2.43] 
-0.007 -0.028 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.052*** -0.126** -0.025** month –7 
[0.45] [1.55] [0.84] [0.40] [0.22] [3.89] [2.24] [2.04] 
-0.002 -0.035** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.034** -0.06 -0.02 month –6 
[0.11] [1.97] [0.73] [0.70] [0.49] [2.53] [1.05] [1.64] 
0.019 0.017 0 0.003 -0.009 -0.043*** -0.133** -0.031** month –5 
[1.26] [0.97] [0.35] [1.54] [1.52] [3.32] [2.53] [2.55] 
-0.003 0.02 0 0.002 0.007 -0.032** -0.140** -0.023* month –4 
[0.19] [1.14] [0.12] [1.19] [1.27] [2.34] [2.50] [1.81] 
0.011 0.025 0 0.002 0 -0.017 -0.126** -0.014 month –3 
[0.72] [1.41] [0.32] [0.83] [0.00] [1.22] [2.12] [1.08] 
0.009 0.024 -0.002 0 -0.003 -0.01 -0.141** 0.041*** month –2 
[0.57] [1.29] [1.25] [0.17] [0.55] [0.76] [2.51] [3.24] 
-0.013 -0.031* -0.002 -0.002 0.020*** -0.045*** -0.280*** 0.082*** month –1 
[0.86] [1.66] [1.23] [1.20] [3.32] [3.31] [4.96] [6.20] 
0.014 -0.006 -0.001 0 0.004 -0.055*** -0.275*** 0.107*** month 0 – elections 
[0.88] [0.34] [0.63] [0.06] [0.60] [3.80] [4.64] [8.26] 
-0.026 -0.043** 0.001 0.002 -0.006 -0.041*** -0.079 0.018 month 1 
[1.55] [2.12] [1.16] [1.25] [1.00] [3.00] [1.38] [1.39] 
0.005 -0.027 0 0.003* -0.007 -0.008 0.01 -0.004 month 2 
[0.29] [1.33] [0.08] [1.72] [1.12] [0.60] [0.18] [0.34] 
-0.02 -0.017 0.001 0.004** -0.016*** 0.021 0.003 0.018 month 3 
[1.15] [0.82] [0.55] [2.17] [2.73] [1.53] [0.05] [1.39] 
0.006 -0.016 0.001 0.004** -0.012** 0.005 0.034 0.022* month 4 
[0.34] [0.76] [0.62] [2.32] [2.01] [0.33] [0.58] [1.71] 
-0.016 -0.041** -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.033 -0.003 month 5 
[0.94] [1.97] [1.16] [0.97] [0.51] [0.43] [0.58] [0.27] 
0.005 -0.025 0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 0.029** month 6 
[0.29] [1.21] [0.72] [1.49] [1.09] [1.03] [0.09] [2.23] 
0.005 -0.004 0 0.003 -0.009 -0.023 -0.064 0.018 month 7 
[0.30] [0.22] [0.18] [1.57] [1.56] [1.61] [1.06] [1.38] 
-0.011 -0.01 -0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.003 -0.049 -0.024* month 8 
[0.66] [0.52] [0.97] [0.62] [0.75] [0.18] [0.81] [1.86] 
0.007 0.002 0 0.002 0.001 -0.012 0.047 0.006 month 9 
[0.42] [0.09] [0.19] [1.10] [0.21] [0.86] [0.76] [0.44] 
0.018 0.014 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.022 0.022 0.034*** month 10 
[1.17] [0.73] [0.77] [1.64] [0.66] [1.39] [0.29] [2.69] 
-0.001 -0.02 0.002* 0.005*** -0.003 -0.037*** -0.078 -0.011 month 11 
[0.05] [1.07] [1.69] [2.68] [0.43] [2.69] [0.94] [0.89] 
0.004 -0.007 0.001 0.005** -0.003 -0.051*** -0.195** 0.063*** month 12 
[0.22] [0.33] [0.47] [2.30] [0.43] [3.72] [2.15] [5.06] 
0.005 -0.125*** 0 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.057 0.014 -0.035*** Constant 
[0.53] [10.96] [0.21] [0.41] [4.69] [1.54] [0.24] [5.04] 
Observations 5974 6235 5968 5986 6700 3920 2141 4617 
# of regions 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
R2 0.12 0.26 0.013 0.828 0.26 0.80 0.37 0.33 
Note: All dependent variables are in logs and de-trended. All except inflation and prices are measured in real terms per capita. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Regressor “Left wing party” dropped out of the regression with regional wage arrears because it is collinear with fixed effects 
over the period for which we have regional wage arrears data. Regional Fixed effects included. 
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Table 4. Determinants of the magnitude of the cycles.  
 Amplitude of the cycles in: 
 
The first component of amplitudes of the 
cycles in six fiscal policies with the 
largest cycles total budgetary 
expenditures 
social 
expenditures 
educa-
tion exp. expenditures on culture 
health-
care 
exp. 
-0.969***        -0.207*** -0.234***   -0.186*** 
Log of share of 
population with higher 
education in 1995 
[3.53]        [3.69] [2.91]   [2.64] 
 -0.989**   -0.214**  -0.511**    -0.200*   Log of share of urban 
population 
 
[2.15] 
 
 [2.16]  [2.40]    [1.74]  
 
  -0.105   -0.069*        Log of # of computers 
per capita 
  
[0.47] 
  
[1.92] 
       
   -0.009    -0.008**    -0.003*  Index of freedom of 
mass media production 
   
[1.41] 
   
[2.42]    [1.68] 
 
-0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** Time [4.03] [3.73] [3.64] [2.61] [2.61] [2.85] [1.55] [1.39] [2.42] [3.95] [3.85] [3.75] [3.54] 
-0.212 -0.152 -0.161 -0.073** -0.073** -0.073** 0.041 0.029 -0.064** 0.031 0.046 0.036 -0.054 Left [1.35] [0.90] [0.96] [2.14] [2.14] [2.10] [0.55] [0.39] [2.15] [0.75] [1.03] [0.84] [1.38] 
3.217*** 4.668** 0.829** 1.085** 1.085** 0.350*** 2.409** 0.537*** 0.745*** 0.833*** 1.020** 0.289*** 0.718*** Constant [3.83] [2.33] [2.38] [2.54] [2.54] [3.40] [2.59] [3.06] [4.60] [3.56] [2.07] [3.23] [3.40] 
Observations 117 118 117 123 123 123 125 124 124 124 125 124 124 
R2 0.176 0.156 0.128 0.122 0.122 0.109 0.086 0.083 0.135 0.171 0.154 0.144 0.13 
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Effect of cycles on probability to get re-elected. 
Proxy for Rationality 
and Awareness: 
Log of share of 
population with 
higher education in 
1995 
Log of share of urban 
population 
Log of # of computers 
per capita 
Index of freedom of 
mass media 
production 
 Dependent Variable: 
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0.445*** 0.347** 0.394*** 0.333** 0.419*** 0.311** 0.389*** 0.345** Amplitude [3.28] [2.16] [2.90] [2.13] [3.38] [2.06] [2.92] [2.13] 
-0.151 0.436 -0.655 0.474 -0.782* 0.035 -0.011 0.003 Amplitude*Rationality [0.26] [0.62] [0.89] [0.48] [1.96] [0.06] [1.23] [0.26] 
0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.002 Amplitude*Time [1.04] [0.26] [1.00] [0.38] [1.27] [0.26] [1.10] [0.33] 
0.679 0.124 0.57 0.503 0.377 0.424 0.018* 0.013 Rationality [1.38] [0.21] [0.64] [0.57] [1.17] [1.28] [1.91] [1.20] 
0.018*** 0.018** 0.016*** 0.017** 0.017*** 0.017** 0.016*** 0.017** Time [3.23] [2.40] [2.64] [2.49] [3.12] [2.42] [2.83] [2.47] 
-1.025*** -1.011*** -1.042*** -0.970*** -1.008*** -0.907*** -1.009*** -0.955*** Left [4.35] [3.94] [4.20] [3.74] [4.16] [3.52] [4.66] [3.80] 
0.028 0.037 0.013 0.033 0.021 0.032 0.017 0.032 Relative Share of 
Soc. Exp. [0.66] [0.51] [0.31] [0.47] [0.56] [0.47] [0.45] [0.47] 
1.101 0.727 1.043 0.921 0.73 1.042 1.105 0.763 Relative Productivity [0.88] [0.44] [0.80] [0.54] [0.57] [0.61] [0.93] [0.47] 
0.003 0.704 -0.984 1.06 -0.62 1.199 -0.273 1.133 Relative Price [0.00] [0.16] [0.22] [0.24] [0.16] [0.27] [0.07] [0.26] 
0.872***  0.900***  0.851***  0.876***  Constant [5.24]  [5.12]  [4.96]  [5.47]  
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 
R2 0.303  0.297  0.322  0.319  
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 32
 
Figure 1.    
Total Budget Expenditures Social Expenditures Share of Social Expenditures Education Expenditures 
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Note: Graphs show the dynamics of the moving average, MA(4), of the aggregate of logs of seasonally adjusted de-trended policy instruments from a year before to a year after 
elections. Zero-month is the month of elections. The policy instruments are normalized, so that zero level on each graph represents the middle of the term level. Two dotted horizontal 
lines on each graph represent the average values of the instrument in a year before and in a year after elections. 
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Figure 2.    
Ratio of Expenditures to Revenues Total Wage Arrears Regional Wage Arrears Growth 
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Note: Graphs show the dynamics of the moving average, MA(4), of the aggregate of logs of seasonally adjusted de-trended policy instruments and outcomes from a year before 
to a year after elections. Zero-month is the month of elections. The policy instruments and outcomes are normalized, so that zero level on each graph represents the middle of 
the term level. Two dotted horizontal lines on each graph represent the average values of the instrument in a year before and in a year after elections. 
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 Appendix A.          
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of policy instruments and outcomes                 
Variable No. of Median Mean S.E. Min Max Time span Source Units
Total Budget Expenditures 5787 24.32 40.92 0.73 6.21 520.91 Mar, 1996 - Nov, MF $ per capita 
Social Expenditures 5934 1.82 2.61 0.04 0.18 30.1 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Share of Social Expenditures 5673 6.9 7.68 0.05 1.13 31.83 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF % 
Education Expenditures 5939 5.53 8.46 0.12 1.51 84.74 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Expenditures on Culture 5928 0.61 0.96 0.02 0.12 11.42 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Healthcare Expenditures 5938 3.78 5.5 0.07 0.85 51.12 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Media Expenditures 5763 0.08 0.16 0 0 3.41 Mar, 1996 - Nov, MF $ per capita 
Share of Media Expenditures 5683 0.3 0.37 0 0 1.83 Mar, 1996 - Nov, MF % 
Expenditures on Industry 5601 0.32 1.52 0.07 0 83.78 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Expenditures on Agriculture 5843 0.85 1.54 0.03 0.01 19.36 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Total Budget Revenues 5940 23.58 38.98 0.69 6.21 474.55 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Tax Revenues 5941 15.71 23.93 0.41 1.45 313.91 Jan, 1996 - Nov, 2001 MF $ per capita 
Ratio of Expenditures to Revenues 5695 101.28 104.56 0.31 48.2 281.5 Mar, 1996 - Nov, MF % 
Growth 6331 0.83 2.19 0.27 -63.41 157.6 Feb, 1995 - Oct, 2001 GKS % 
Inflation 9831 2.8 7.46 0.13 -1.3 213.5 Feb, 1992 - Nov, GKS % 
Level of Industrial Output 6598 92.55 0.12 0 0 1.06 Jan, 1995 - Oct, 2001 GKS $ per capita 
Total Wage Arrears 4143 25.51 0.05 0 0 0.66 Oct, 1997 - Sep, 2000 GKS $ per capita 
Regional Wage Arrears 2391 1.84 0.01 0 0 0.25 Jan, 1999 - Sep, 2000 GKS $ per capita 
Wage level 6975 124.12 155.39 1.18 46.28 652.4 Feb, 1995 - Oct, 2001 GKS $ per capita 
Price Level 4850 0.99 121.58 1.03 32.43 553.68 Jan, 1992 - Nov, 2001 GKS relative to Apr, 
Money Income 5787 101.63 40.92 0.73 6.21 520.91 Jan, 1995 - Oct, 1999 GKS $ per capita 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics of electoral variables               
Variable No. of Median Mean S.E. Min Max
Dummy for participation of incumbents 198 1 0.949 0.016 0 1   
Dummy for incumbents’ win 188 1 0.665 0.035 0 1   
Dummy for incumbent’s loss worse than the second 188 0 0.059 0.017 0 1   
% of votes pro incumbent 186 56.43 53.908 1.682 4.76 99.9   
% of votes pro main competitor of incumbent 173 28.5 32.51 1.587 0.71 82   
% of votes pro winner 196 59.71 62.599 1.088 23.5 99.9   
% of votes pro the first runner up 182 24.11 24.015 0.949 0.71 48   
Number of candidates 193 5 5.523 0.211 1 16   
Note: Statistics are presented for 198 Russian regional elections between 1992 and 2002.      
Panel C. Descriptive statistics of rationality and awareness measures           
Variable Regions Median Mean S.E. Min Max
Log of education in 1995 76 2.75 2.78 0.03 2.19 3.68   
Log of share of urban population 86 4.23 4.17 0.03 2.91 4.61   
Log of number of computers per capita in 1998 83 2.5 2.43 0.06 0.68 3.64   
Index of freedom of media production 81 37 36.25 1.59 0 75   
